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AbstrACt
Categorising mental disorders for purposes of 
diagnosis, research and practice has historically 
been justified on philosophical terms as a 
pragmatic activity; categories which have been 
subject to wide-ranging philosophical critique 
have been defended on the grounds that they 
serve as heuristic devices providing loose 
representations of shared experiences, not 
labels for real structures. In acknowledgement 
of this, there has been increasing recognition 
that subclassifying multiple discrete forms 
of persistent depression moves too far away 
from the notion of a heuristic and that 
attempts to create more precise categories 
become less clinically useful. Hence the most 
recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (V.5) and International 
Classification of Diseases (V.11) both group 
persistent forms of depression together. 
However, the UK National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence has delineated certain 
subclassifications of persistent depression in 
its new guideline, which grossly distorts the 
phenomenology of depression. This approach 
commits a fundamental philosophical error 
in conflating absence of knowledge with 
knowledge of absence. In this sense, the 
new guideline appears to be engaging in an 
activity akin to the digital game Minecraft, 
in which the craft of building structures from 
units of construction is largely divorced from 
the laws of physics. The risk of ignoring these 
philosophical errors and making false claims 
about scientific plausibility is that the guideline 
recommendations inevitably represent a 
highly distorted phenomenology of depression 
and will be of very little value to patients or 
practitioners looking for guidance on best 
possible treatment options.
INtrodUCtIoN
Minecraft is a computer game with no 
specific goals to accomplish. The game-
world consists of three-dimensional (3D) 
cubes and objects which the player (Steve) 
can mine and build into infinitely complex 
(and logically impossible) structures. 
Steve sometimes encounters other charac-
ters (‘mobs’), such as animals and hostile 
creatures; he can ‘spawn’ and destroy 
them. While it looks like a harmless game 
of logical construction, it conveys some 
worryingly delusive ideas about the real 
world. The difference between real and 
imagined structures is at the heart of the 
age-old debate around categorising mental 
disorders.
Classification in mental health has had 
various forms throughout history. Mack 
and colleagues set out a history of psychi-
atric classification beginning in 2600 
BC with Egyptian references to melan-
cholia and hysteria; through the Ancient 
Greeks with Hippocrates’ phrenitis, 
mania, melancholia, epilepsy, hysteria and 
Scythian disease; through the Renaissance 
period; through to 19th-century psychi-
atry featuring Pinel (known as the first 
psychiatrist), Kraepelin (known for obser-
vational classification) and Freud (known 
for classifying neurosis and psychosis).1
Although the history of psychiatric 
classification identifies some common 
trends such as the labels ‘melancholia’ and 
‘hysteria’ which have survived millennia, 
the label ‘depression’ is relatively new. 
The earliest usage noted by Snaith is from 
1899: ‘in simple pathological depres-
sion…the patient exhibits a growing indif-
ference to his former pursuits…’.2 Snaith 
noted that early 20th-century psychiatrists 
like Adolf Meyer hoped that ‘depression’ 
would come to encompass a broad cate-
gory under which descriptions of subtypes 
would emerge. This did not happen until 
the middle of the 20th century. With the 
publication of the sixth International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 1948 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1952 and 
their subsequent revisions, the latter half 
of the 20th century has seen depression 
subtype labels proliferate. In their study of 
the social determinants of diagnostic labels 
in depression, McPherson and Armstrong 
illustrate how the codification of depres-
sion subtypes in the latter half of the 20th 
century has been shaped by the evolving 
context of psychiatry, including power 
struggles within the profession, a move to 
community care and the development of 
psychopharmacology.3
During this period, McPherson and 
Armstrong describe how subsequent 
versions of the DSM served as battle-
grounds for professional disputes and 
philosophical quarrels around categori-
sation of mental disorders. DSM I and 
DSM II have been described as products 
of an American Psychiatric Association 
dominated by psychoanalytic psychi-
atrists.4 DSM III and DSM III-R have 
been described as a radical rejection of 
psychoanalytic thinking, a ‘neo-Krae-
pelinian revolution’, a reference to the 
observational descriptive techniques of 
19th-century psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin 
who classified mental disorders into two 
broad categories: ‘dementia praecox’ and 
‘manic-depression’.5 DSM III was seen by 
some as a turning point in the use of the 
medical model of mental illness, through 
provision of specific inclusion and exclu-
sion criteria, and use of field trials and a 
multiaxial system.6 These latter techno-
cratic additions to psychiatric labelling 
served to engender a much closer align-
ment between psychiatry, science and 
medicine.
The codification of mental disorders in 
manuals has been described by Thomas 
Schacht as intrinsic to the relationship 
between science and politics and the way 
in which psychiatrists gain significant 
social power by aligning themselves to 
science.7 His argument drew on Szasz, 
who saw the mental health establishment 
as a therapeutic state; Zimbardo, who 
described psychiatric care as a controlling 
force; and Foucault, who described the 
categorisation of the mentally ill as a 
force for isolating ‘the other’. Diagnostic 
critique has been further developed 
through a cultural relativist lens in that 
what Western psychiatrists classify as a 
depression is constructed differently in 
other cultures.8 Considering these limita-
tions, some critics have gone so far as to 
argue that psychiatric diagnostic systems 
should be abolished.9
Yet architects of DSM manuals have 
worked hard to ensure the technology of 
classification is regarded as genuine scien-
tific activity with sound roots in philos-
ophy of science. In their philosophical 
defence of DSM IV, Allen Frances and 
colleagues address their critics under the 
headings ‘nominalism vs realism’, ‘empir-
icism vs rationalism’ and ‘categorical vs 
dimensional’.10 The implication is that 
there are opposing stances in which a 
choice must be made or a middle ground 
forged by those reasonable enough to 
recognise the need for pragmatism in the 
service of clinical utility. The nominalism–
realism debate is illustrated using as 
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metaphor three different stances a cricket 
umpire might take on calling strikes and 
balls. The discussion sets out two of these 
as extreme views: ‘at one extreme…those 
who take a reductionistically realistic 
view of the world’ versus ‘the solipsistic 
nominalists…might content that nothing 
exists’. Szasz, who is characterised as 
holding particularly extreme views, is 
named as an archetypal solipsist. There is 
implied to be a degree of arrogance asso-
ciated with this view in the illustrative 
example in which the umpire states ‘there 
are no balls and there are no strikes until 
I call them’. Frances therefore sets up a 
means of grouping two kinds of people 
as philosophical extremists who can be 
dismissed, while avoiding addressing the 
philosophical problems they pose.
Frances provides little if any justifica-
tion for the middle ground stance, ‘There 
are balls and there are strikes and I call 
them as I see them’, other than to focus on 
its clinical utility and the lack of clinical 
utility in the alternatives ‘naïve realism’ 
and ‘heuristically barren solipsism’. The 
natural conclusion the reader is invited to 
reach is that a middle ground of a heuristic 
concept is naturally right because it is not 
extreme and is naturally useful clinically, 
without specifying in what way this stance 
is coherent, resolves the two alternatives, 
and in what way a heuristic construct that 
is not ‘real’ can be subject to scientific 
testing.
Similarly, in discussing the ‘categor-
ical vs dimensional’, Frances promotes 
the ‘prototype approach’. Those holding 
opposing views are labelled as ‘dual-
ists’ or ‘dichotomisers’. The prototypical 
approach is again put forward as a clin-
ically useful middle ground. Illustrations 
are drawn from natural science: ‘a triangle 
and a square are never the same’, inciting 
the reader to consider science as value-
free. The prototypical approach emerges 
as a natural solution, yet the authors do 
not address how a diagnostic prototype 
resolves the issues posed by the two 
alternatives, nor how a prototype can be 
subjected to natural science methods.
The argument presented here is not a 
defence of solipsism or dualism; rather 
it aims to illustrate that if for pragmatic 
purposes clinicians and policymakers 
choose to gloss over the philosophical 
flaws in classification practices, it is then 
risky to move beyond the heuristic and 
apply natural science methods to these 
constructs adding multiple layers of tech-
nocratic subclassification. Doing so is 
more like playing Minecraft than cricket. 
The National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) guideline for 
depression is taken as an example of the 
philosophical errors that can follow from 
playing Minecraft with unsound heuristic 
devices, specifically subcategories of 
persistent forms of depression. As well 
as serving a clinical purpose, diagnosis in 
medicine is a way of allocating resources 
for insurance companies and constructing 
clinical guidelines, which in turn deter-
mine rationing within the National Health 
Service. The consequences for recipients 
of healthcare are therefore significant; 
clinical utility is arguably not being served 
at all and patients are left at risk of poor-
quality care.
Heterogeneity of persistent depression
Andrea Jobst and colleagues note that 
‘because of their chronic clinical course, 
approximately 40% of CD [chronic 
depression] patients also fulfil criteria for 
TRD [treatment resistant depression]…
usually defined by the number of non-suc-
cessful biological treatments’.11 This 
position is reflected in the DSM VAmer-
ican Psychiatric Association (2013), the 
European Psychiatric Association (EPA) 
guidance and the ICD-11(World Health 
Organisation, 2018), which all use a 
‘persistent’ depression category, acknowl-
edging a loosely defined mixed group 
of long-term, difficult-to-treat depres-
sive conditions, often associated with 
dysthymia and comorbid common mental 
disorders, various personality traits and 
psychosocial disability.
In contrast, the NICE 2018 draft guide-
line separates treatments into those for 
‘new episodes’ of depression: ‘further-
line’ treatment of depression (equiva-
lent to TRD), CD and ‘depression with 
co-morbidities’. The latter is subdivided 
into treatments for ‘complex depression’ 
and ‘psychotic depression’. These cate-
gories and subcategories introduce an 
unfortunate sense of certainty as though 
these labels represent real things. An anal-
ysis follows of how these definitions play 
out in terms of grouping of randomised 
controlled trials in the NICE evidence 
review. Specifically, the analysis reveals 
the overlap between populations in trials 
which have been separated into discrete 
categories, revealing significant limitations 
to the utility of the category labels.
The NICE definition of CD requires 
trial samples to meet the criteria for 
major depressive disorder (MDD) for 2 
years. Dysthymia and double depression 
(MDD superimposed on dysthymia) were 
included. If 75% of the trial population 
met these criteria, the trial was reviewed 
in the CD category.12 The definition 
of TRD (or ‘further-line treatments’) 
required that the trial sample had demon-
strated a ‘limited response to previous 
treatment’ and randomised to the further-
line treatment at this point. If 80% of the 
trial participants met these criteria, it was 
reviewed in the TRD category.13 Complex 
depression was defined as ‘depression 
co-existing with personality disorder’. To 
be classed as complex, 51% of trial partic-
ipants had to have personality disorder 
(PD).14
It is immediately clear from these defini-
tions that there is a potential problem with 
attempting to categorise trial populations 
into just one of these categories. These 
populations are likely to overlap, whether 
or not a trial protocol sets out to explicitly 
record all of this information. The analysis 
below will illustrate this using examples 
from within the NICE review.
Cataloguing complexity in trial 
populations
Within the category of further-line treat-
ments (TRD), 64 trials were reviewed. 
Comparisons within these trials were 
further subcategorised into ‘dose esca-
lation strategies’, ‘augmentation strate-
gies’ and ‘switching strategies’. In drilling 
down by way of illustration, this analysis 
considers the 51 trials in the augmentation 
strategy evidence review. Of these, two 
were classified by the reviewers as also 
fulfilling the criteria for CD but were not 
analysed in the CD category (Study IDs: 
Fonagy 2015 and Kocsis 200915). About 
half of the trials (23/51) did not report the 
mean duration of episode, meaning that it 
is not possible to know what percentage of 
participants also met the criteria for CD. 
Of trials that did report episode duration, 
17 reported a mean duration longer than 
24 months. While the standard deviations 
varied in size or were unreported, the 
mean indicates a good likelihood that a 
significant proportion of the participants 
across these 51 trials met the criteria for 
CD.
Details of baseline employment, trauma 
history, suicidality, physical comorbidity, 
axis I comorbidity and PD (all clinical 
indicators of complexity, severity and 
chronicity) were not collated by NICE. 
For the present analysis, all 51 publica-
tions were examined and data compiled 
concerning clinical complexity in the trial 
populations. Only 14 of 51 trials report 
employment data. Of those that do, 
unemployment ranges from 12% to 56% 
across trial samples. None of the trials 
report trauma history. About half of the 
trials (26/51) excluded people who were 
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considered a suicide risk; the others did 
not.
A large proportion of trials (30/51) did 
not provide any data on axis 1 comor-
bidity. Of these, 18 did not exclude any 
diagnoses, while 12 excluded some (but 
not all) disorders. The most common 
diagnoses excluded were psychotic disor-
ders, substance or alcohol abuse, and 
bipolar disorder (excluded in 26, 25 and 
23 trials, respectively). Only 7 of 51 trials 
clearly stated that all axis 1 diagnoses 
were excluded. This leaves only 13 studies 
providing any data about comorbidity: of 
these, 9 gave partial data on one or two 
conditions, while 4 reported either the 
mean number of disorders (range 1.96–
2.9) or the percentage of participants 
(range 68.1–96.7) with any comorbid 
diagnosis (Nierenberg 2003a, Nierenberg 
2006, Watkins 2011a, Town 201715).
The majority of trials (46/51) did 
not report the prevalence of PD. Many 
stated PD as an exclusion criterion but 
without defining a threshold for exclu-
sion. For example, PD could be excluded 
if it ‘impacted’ the depression, if it was 
‘significant’, ‘severe’ or ‘persistent’. Some 
excluded certain PDs (such as antisocial 
or borderline) and not others but without 
reporting the prevalence of those not 
excluded. In the five trials where preva-
lence was clear, prevalence ranged from 
0% (Ravindran 2008a15), where all PDs 
were excluded, to 87.5% of the sample 
(Town 201715). Two studies reported the 
mean number of PDs: 2.0 (Nierenberg 
2003a) and 0.85 (Watkins 2011a15).
The majority of trials (43/51) did not 
report the prevalence of physical illness. 
Many stated illness as an exclusion crite-
rion, but the definitions and thresholds 
were vague and could be interpreted in 
different ways. For example, illness could 
be excluded if it was ‘unstable’, ‘serious’, 
‘significant’, ‘relevant’, or would ‘contra-
indicate’ or ‘impact’ the medication. 
Of the eight trials reporting informa-
tion about physical health, there was a 
wide variation. Four reported prevalence 
varying from 7.6% having a disability 
(Eisendrath 201615) to 90.9% having an 
illness or disability (Town 201715). Four 
used scales of physical health: two indi-
cating mild problems (Nierenberg 2006, 
Lavretsky 201115) and two indicating 
moderately high levels of illness (Thase 
2007, Fang 201015).
The NICE review also divided trial 
populations into a dichotomy of ‘more 
severe’ and ‘less severe’ on the grounds 
that this would be a clinically useful 
classification for general practitioners. 
NICE applied a bespoke methodology for 
creating this dichotomy, abandoning vali-
dated measure thresholds in order first to 
generate two ‘homogeneous’ groups to 
‘facilitate analysis’, and second to create 
an algorithm to ‘read across’ different 
measures (such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory, the Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (HRSD) and the Montgom-
ery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale).16 
Examining trials which use more than 
one of these measures reveals problems in 
the algorithm. Of the 51 trials, there are 
6 instances in which the study population 
falls into NICE’s more severe category 
according to one measure and into the less 
severe category according to another. In 
four of these trials, NICE chose the less 
severe category (Souza 2016, Watkins 
2011a, Fonagy 2015, Town 201715). The 
other two trials were designated more 
severe (Barbee 2011, Dunner 200715). 
Only 17 of 51 trials reported two or more 
depression scale measures, leaving much 
unknown about whether other study 
populations could count as both more 
severe and less severe.
Absence of knowledge or knowledge of 
absence?
A key philosophical error in science is to 
confuse an absence of knowledge with 
knowledge of absence. It is likely that 
some of the study populations deemed 
lacking in complexity or severity could 
actually have high degrees of complexity 
and/or severity. Data to demonstrate 
this may either fall foul of a guideline 
committee decision to prioritise certain 
information over other conflicting infor-
mation (as in the severity algorithm); the 
information may be non-existent as it was 
not collected; it may be somewhere in the 
publication pipeline; or it may be sitting 
in a database with a research team that has 
run out of funds for supplementary anal-
yses. Wherever those data are or are not, 
their absence from published articles does 
not define the phenomenology of depres-
sion for the patients who took part. As a 
case in point, data from the Fonagy 2015 
trial presented at conferences but not 
published reveal that PD prevalence data 
would place the trial well within the NICE 
complex depression category, and that the 
sample had high levels of past trauma and 
physical condition comorbidity. The trial 
also meets the guideline criteria for CD 
according to the guideline’s own appen-
dices.17 Reported axis 1 comorbidity was 
high (75.2% had anxiety disorder, 18.6% 
had substance abuse disorder, 13.2% had 
eating disorder).18 The mean depression 
scores at baseline were 36.5 on the Beck 
Depression Inventory and 20.1 on the 
HRSD (severe and very severe, respec-
tively, according to published cut-off 
scores). NICE categorised this popula-
tion as less severe TRD, not CD and not 
complex.
CoNClUsIoN: ClINICAl fUtIlIty of 
CUboIdIsM
There are philosophical flaws in the 
NICE guideline’s overly technocratic 
approach to subclassification of depres-
sion. Information available in a journal 
publication about study populations is 
not a clear and fulsome representation of 
the varied experiences of the individuals 
concerned, particularly as journal word 
limits often prevent fuller reporting of 
trial data. Moreover, carving up human 
experience into more and more cuboids 
does not make a heuristic labelling 
device more clinically useful; it does the 
opposite. NICE’s cuboidism concerning 
persistent depression deviates markedly 
from the ICD and DSM manuals, as well 
as the EPA guideline and the American 
Psychological Association draft depres-
sion guideline.19 The result is that the UK 
guideline for depression represents an 
impossible structure that would horrify a 
structural engineer. While science should 
be employed to help us understand 
reality, this approach to the philosophy 
of science obscures realities encountered 
by patients and practitioners because the 
underpinning philosophy has warped 
into a gameworld logic.
This is one among a number of episte-
mological concerns expressed by profes-
sional bodies and patient groups about 
the NICE draft depression guideline and 
which led to a joint statement warning that 
the guideline will be unfit for purpose.20 
Unlike Minecraft, NICE has a specific goal 
to accomplish: guidance which enables 
best possible patient care which will ulti-
mately dictate rationing of services for UK 
patients. With a new draft scheduled for 
publication in February 2020, there may 
yet be scope for NICE to move away from 
a warped 3D gameworld and reconsider 
professional and patient concerns about 
the clinical futility of cuboidism.
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